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INTERPRETING THE WISCONSIN
CONSTITUTION
DANIEL R. SUHR
The Wisconsin Constitution is the state’s fundamental law and is often
the final authority over important issues of public moment. When interpreting a provision in the state constitution, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
relies on three primary sources: the plain meaning of the text, the legislative and ratification history surrounding the clause, and construction by
the legislature. The second and third sources that the Court uses to resolve constitutional cases are significantly flawed for both practical and
jurisprudential reasons.
By contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court focuses first and foremost
on the text when interpreting statutes. The Court only turns to history
when it must to resolve an obstinate ambiguity. This approach avoids the
flaws associated with the Court’s current method of constitutional interpretation while also advancing positive values for the rule of law. Therefore, the author recommends that in its next constitutional case the Court
should set aside its current methodology for constitutional interpretation
and instead announce its adoption of its statutory method for constitutional cases as well.
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The challenge to the legislation here requires us to interpret the meaning of a constitutional amendment ratified by voters. Consequently, our
task is to construe the amendment “to give effect to the intent . . . of the
people who adopted it.” We examine three sources to determine voter
intent: “the plain meaning, the constitutional debates and practices of
the time, and the earliest interpretations of the provision by the legislature, as manifested through the first legislative action following adoption.” In contrast with statutory construction, we do not stop with an
analysis of the text, even if that analysis reveals unambiguous language.
1

—Wisconsin Court of Appeals, Appling v. Doyle
I. INTRODUCTION

State ex rel. Kalal v. Dane County Circuit Court is a landmark in
2
Wisconsin Supreme Court history. The outcome of the case was unre3
markable—the statute at issue was and remains obscure. Rather, Kalal
is significant because the Court’s discussion of statutory interpretation
moved the entire legal system of the state towards textualism and away
from more malleable interpretative methods. Kalal gave Wisconsin
courts a whole new framework for statutory interpretation. The case
mandates that a court must first ask whether the statute’s text is ambig4
uous. If not, the court should apply the plain meaning of the text. Only
if the text is ambiguous may a court resort to extrinsic sources to resolve
5
the ambiguity. Kalal deemphasized legislative history as an unreliable
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1. Appling v. Doyle, 2013 WI App 3, ¶ 11, 345 Wis. 2d 762, 826 N.W.2d 666 (emphasis
added) (citations omitted) (quoting Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107,
¶ 19, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408) (citing Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 568, 247 N.W.2d
141, 149 (1976)).
2. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.
3. WIS. STAT. § 968.02(3) (2011–2012) (providing that a circuit judge may permit the filing of a complaint charging a person with a crime if the district attorney is unavailable or refuses to issue one); Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶ 53, 57 (concluding that “refuses” under section
968.02(3) was clear and unambiguous and affirming the circuit judge’s decision to file a complaint when the district attorney refused to do so).
4. Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45.
5. Id. ¶ 46. Professor Abbe Gluck refers to this as “modified textualism.” Abbe R.
Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and
the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1750 (2010); see also Adam G. Yoffie,
From Poritz to Rabner: The New Jersey Supreme Court’s Statutory Jurisprudence, 2000–2009,
35 SETON HALL LEG. J. 302, 311–15, 330 (2011) (discussing textualism and legislative history
in the New Jersey Supreme Court through the lenses of Eskridge and Gluck).
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6

guide for the interpretation of statutes. Instead, Justice Diane Sykes’s
majority opinion upheld textualist values such as respect for the rule of
7
law and judicial modesty.
8
Kalal’s commitment to textualism began with state statutes, but its
rule has since been extended to other categories of legal texts, including
9
10
11
federal statutes, local ordinances, state administrative rules, local
12
13
administrative rules, and supreme court rules. Unique among other
types of public law, the state constitution is not subject to Kalal. When
the Wisconsin Supreme Court interprets the Wisconsin Constitution, it
instead uses a tripartite methodology first formalized in Busé v. Smith in
1974: plain meaning, legislative and popular history, and contemporane14
ous acts of the legislature. As the Wisconsin Court of Appeals stated
in the decision quoted as the epigram of this Article, Busé requires
courts to go beyond the plain meaning of the constitution’s text, even
15
when that meaning is unambiguous.
The court’s current approach to state constitutional interpretation is
flawed because of its dependence on unreliable tools to perform an impossible task—discerning the hidden intent and unexpressed purpose of
millions of voters. The Kalal framework avoids these pitfalls and advances positive values for the rule of law. As it has already done in other areas of public law, the Wisconsin Supreme Court should extend
Kalal’s methodology to state constitutional interpretation.
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6. Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶ 50–52.
7. Id. ¶ 52.
8. Id. ¶ 53.
9. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 2006 WI 88, ¶ 36, 293 Wis. 2d 202, 717
N.W.2d 280.
10. Magnolia Twp. v. Town of Magnolia, 2005 WI App 119, ¶ 9, 284 Wis. 2d 361, 701
N.W.2d 60.
11. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v. Menasha Corp., 2008 WI 88, ¶ 63, 311 Wis. 2d 579, 754
N.W.2d 95.
12. Nelson & Sons Painting v. Cardenas, 306 Wis. 2d 449, No. 2007AP645, 2007 WL
2935808, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2007) (unpublished table opinion).
13. In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gableman, 2010 WI 62, ¶¶ 1, 30, 325
Wis. 2d 631, 784 N.W.2d 631 (opinion of Prosser, Roggensack, & Ziegler, JJ.); State v. Henley, 2010 WI 12, ¶¶ 1, 11, 322 Wis. 2d 1, 778 N.W.2d 853 (opinion of Roggensack, J.) (sitting
as a single Justice).
14. Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 568, 247 N.W.2d 141, 149 (1976).
15. Appling v. Doyle, 2013 WI App 3, ¶ 11, 345 Wis. 2d 762, 826 N.W.2d 666 (citing
Busé, 74 Wis. 2d at 568).
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II. INTERPRETING THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION
In the earliest days of the state, the Wisconsin Supreme Court used
the same methodology to interpret both constitutional and statutory
16
texts. Until 1974, the court relied on classical principles for all interpretive questions. The court would begin with the plain meaning of the
17
words used. The court looked to the original public meaning of the
text; “[t]he meaning of the constitutional provision having been once
firmly established as of the time of its adoption, such meaning continues
18
forever, unless it is changed or modified by the constitution.” One
19
guide to this public meaning was popular dictionaries. In Kayden Industries, Inc., decided in 1967, the court declared:
Where there is no ambiguity in the literal terms of the [constitutional] provision under consideration there is no room for judicial construction. . . . And the court may not venture outside the
plain meaning of a provision in order to create an ambiguity and
20
then resolve the ambiguity by what it finds outside.

01/13/2014 11:22:05

C M
Y K

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 52 Side B

16. State ex rel. Bond v. French, 2 Pin. 181, 184 (Wis. 1849) (“In deciding this question,
our only guide is the constitution, in construing which we are to be governed by the same
general rules of interpretation which prevail in relation to statutes.”); see also State ex rel.
Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 191, 204 N.W. 803, 807 (1925) (“[I]n construing the constitution we are governed by the same rules of interpretation which prevail in relation to statutes.” (citing Bond, 2 Pin. at 184)); Akerly v. Vilas, 24 Wis. 165, 181 (1869).
17. Payne v. City of Racine, 217 Wis. 550, 555, 259 N.W. 437, 439 (1935) (“‘[I]t is presumed that words appearing in a constitution have been used according to their plain, natural
and usual signification and import, and the courts are not at liberty to disregard the plain
meaning of words of a constitution in order to search for some other conjured intent.’” (quoting approvingly from 6 RULING CASE LAW Constitutional Law § 47 (William M McKinney et
al. eds., 1929))); B.F. Sturtevant Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 186 Wis. 10, 19, 202 N.W. 324, 327
(1925).
18. State ex rel. Bare v. Schinz, 194 Wis. 397, 403, 216 N.W. 509, 511–12 (1927); see also
Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 368, 133 N.W. 209, 222 (1911) (Barnes, J., concurring); id. at
371–73 (Marshall, J., concurring). But see id. at 349 (majority opinion) (“When an eighteenth
century constitution forms the charter of liberty of a twentieth century government must its
general provisions be construed and interpreted by an eighteenth century mind in the light of
eighteenth century conditions and ideals? Clearly not.”).
19. Ekern, 187 Wis. at 194 (looking to a definition from the Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia). But see State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Dammann, 201 Wis. 84, 97, 228 N.W. 593,
598 (1930) (“We realize fully that a matter of this kind ought not to be determined wholly upon the basis of dictionary definitions; that what is to be sought is the intent as expressed in the
constitution as amended.”).
20. Kayden Indus., Inc. v. Murphy, 34 Wis. 2d 718, 732, 150 N.W.2d 447, 453–54 (1967)
(citing State ex rel. Neelen v. Lucas, 24 Wis. 2d 262, 267, 128 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1964) for the
first proposition and Estate of Ries, 259 Wis. 453, 459, 49 N.W.2d 483, 486 (1951) for the second). Interestingly, both Neelen and Estate of Ries were statutory interpretation cases, show-
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When a constitutional provision was ambiguous, the court sought to
follow “the real meaning and substantial purpose of those who adopted
21
it.” In these cases, the court attempted to effect the purpose of the
22
amendment and the intended meaning of the framers. The primary
sources used to establish them were the debates at the 1846 and 1848
23
constitutional conventions. The court also considered past practice by
responsible government officials and contemporaneous legislative con24
struction. The justices also reviewed analogous constitutional provi25
sions from other states. New York, in particular, was accorded a special status because history shows that the Wisconsin drafters looked to
26
the New York Constitution of 1846 as a model, although Wisconsin
courts were not bound in their interpretation of the Wisconsin Constitution by New York courts’ interpretation of analog New York constitu27
tional provisions. These general principles governed interpretation of
the state constitution for much of Wisconsin’s history.
The modern era began with Board of Education v. Sinclair, decided
in October 1974. Interpreting the meaning of “free” in the Wisconsin
Constitution’s article on education, the court “look[ed] first to the plain
28
meaning of the word in the context in which it [was] used.” Second,
the court conducted a “historical analysis of what practices were in existence in 1848 which we [could] reasonably presume were also known
29
to the framers of the 1848 constitution.” After doing this, the court

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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ing that the principle from French that constitutional and statutory interpretation were the
same remained effective as late as 1967. See also Kayden Indus., Inc., 34 Wis. 2d at 732.
21. State ex rel. Martin v. Heil, 242 Wis. 41, 55, 7 N.W.2d 375, 381 (1942).
22. Kayden Indus. Inc., 34 Wis. 2d at 729–30; Dammann, 201 Wis. at 96; Ekern, 187 Wis.
at 184; State ex rel. Owen v. Donald, 160 Wis. 21, 81, 151 N.W. 331, 350 (1915).
23. Heil, 242 Wis. at 55; State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 289–90, 221 N.W. 860,
862 (1928); Owen, 160 Wis. at 81.
24. State ex rel. Pluntz v. Johnson, 176 Wis. 107, 114–15, 186 N.W. 729, 730 (1922); Owen, 160 Wis. at 111 (quoting Harrington v. Smith, 28 Wis. 43, 68, (1871)).
25. Heil, 242 Wis. at 53–54 (quoting the constitutions of West Virginia and Nebraska to
“illustrate the points made”).
26. State v. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶ 35 n.11, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460; Bablitch
& Bablitch v. Lincoln Cnty., 82 Wis. 2d 574, 577, 263 N.W.2d 218, 221 (1978); Heil, 242 Wis. at
56–57; B.F. Sturtevant Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 186 Wis. 10, 16, 202 N.W. 324, 326 (1925); Jacobs v. Major (Jacobs I), 132 Wis. 2d 82, 101, 390 N.W.2d 86, 92 (Ct. App. 1986); see also
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 SW. L.J. 951, 955 (1982).
27. B.F. Sturtevant Co., 186 Wis. at 17 (considering and rejecting a rule found by a New
York court considering an analog provision); see also Jacobs I, 132 Wis. 2d at 101 (restating
this principle from B.F. Sturtevant Co.).
28. Bd. of Educ. v. Sinclair, 65 Wis. 2d 179, 182, 222 N.W.2d 143, 145 (1974).
29. Id. at 182–83.
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“turn[ed] next to the earliest interpretation of this section of the constitution by the legislature as manifested in the first law passed following
30
the adoption of the constitution.”
One month later, the court announced in Busé v. Smith: “In its interpretation of constitutional provisions[,] this court is committed to the
31
method of analysis utilized in Board of Education v. Sinclair.” This
three-step analysis has governed the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s approach to constitutional interpretation in almost every case since its an32
nouncement. In a later case, the court suggested a fourth step that is
not traditionally incorporated alongside the original three: “[W]hen the
Sinclair and Busé rules of constitutional interpretation do not provide an
answer, the meaning of a constitutional provision may be determined by
33
looking at the objectives of the framers in adopting the provision.”
It has been said on occasion, most recently in Coulee Catholic
Schools v. LIRC, that the court can end its analysis of a constitutional
34
provision if the meaning of the text is plain; however, in the over-

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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30. Id. at 184.
31. Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 568, 247 N.W.2d 141, 149 (1976). As Professor Gluck
points out, statements like this by state supreme courts stand in interesting contrast to the
U.S. Supreme Court, where previous decisions do not set binding methodologies for future
decisions. See generally Gluck, supra note 5 (discussing “methodological stare decisis”).
32. There are a handful of individual exceptions where the Wisconsin Supreme Court
did not use this methodology. See, e.g., McConkey v. Van Hollen, 2010 WI 57, ¶ 44, 326 Wis.
2d 1, 783 N.W.2d 855 (“The general purpose of a constitutional amendment is not an interpretive riddle. Text and historical context should make the purpose of most amendments apparent. A plain reading of the text of the amendment will usually reveal a general, unified
purpose. A court might also find other extrinsic contextual sources helpful in determining
what the amendment sought to change or affirm, including the previous constitutional structure, legislative and public debates over the amendment’s adoption, the title of the joint resolution, the common name for the amendment, the question submitted to the people for a
vote, legislative enactments following adoption of the amendment, and other such sources.”).
Also, the court has developed its own line of precedents to which it defaults for particular
provisions of the constitution. See, e.g., State v. Abbott Labs., 2012 WI 62, ¶¶ 29–44, 341 Wis.
2d 510, 816 N.W.2d 145 (analyzing the constitutional provision creating a right to a civil jury
trial by ascertaining whether a cause of action existed at common law in 1848, and if so, if the
cause was recognized as “at law” as opposed to in equity (citing Vill. Food & Liquor Mart v.
H & S Petroleum, Inc., 2002 WI 92, ¶¶ 10, 13, 15–16, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 647 N.W.2d 177)).
33. State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 138, 341 N.W.2d 668, 676 (1984); see also Davis v.
Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 556, 480 N.W.2d 460, 481 (1992) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting); Jacobs I, 132 Wis. 2d 82, 126, 390 N.W.2d 86, 102–103 (Ct. App. 1986) (Gartzke, P.J., concurring).
34. Coulee Catholic Schs. v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, ¶ 57, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868
(“The authoritative, and usually final, indicator of the meaning of a provision is the text—the
actual words used.”); Jacobs v. Major (Jacobs II), 139 Wis. 2d 492, 504, 407 N.W.2d 832, 837
(1987) (“We need go no further than holding that Art. I, sec. 3 has [a] plain, unambiguous
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35

whelming majority of its cases the court considers all three elements.
When considering the first element, “[t]he plain meaning of the words is
best discerned by understanding their obvious and ordinary meaning at
36
the time the provision was adopted.” Dictionaries remain standard
37
tools of interpretation. Sometimes the words are used elsewhere in the

01/13/2014 11:22:05
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meaning . . . .”); Jacobs I, 132 Wis. 2d at 126 (Gartzke, P.J., concurring); accord Nat’l Pride at
Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, 540 (Mich. 2008) (“When the language of a
constitutional provision is unambiguous, resort to extrinsic evidence is prohibited . . . .”); see
also State ex rel. Kuehne v. Burdette, 2009 WI 119, ¶ 9, 320 Wis. 2d 784, 772 N.W.2d 225 (“To
discern the meaning of these provisions, ‘[c]ourts should give priority to the plain meaning of
the words of [the] provision in the context used.’” (quoting Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc.
v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶ 117, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408)); Erik LeRoy, Comment, The
Egalitarian Roots of the Education Article of the Wisconsin Constitution: Old History, New
Interpretation, Buse v. Smith Criticized, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1325, 1337–38 (suggesting that the
court look to history and legislative action only if plain meaning is absent); cf In re Jerrell
C.J., 2005 WI 105, ¶ 73, 238 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110 (suggesting that plain meaning is the
best source for interpretation).
35. Cases list all three elements on an equal footing. See, e.g., Dairyland Greyhound
Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶ 19, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408; League of Women
Voters v. Walker, 2013 WI 77, ¶ 31, 348 Wis. 2d 714, 834 N.W.2d 393; Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 2005 WI 129, ¶ 122, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 701 N.W.2d 523; Schilling v. Wis. Crime
Victims Rights Bd., 2005 WI 17, ¶ 16, 278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 N.W.2d 623; Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. Wis. Dep’t of Natural Res., 2004 WI 40, ¶ 44, 270 Wis. 2d 318,
677 N.W.2d 612; State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶ 64 n.29, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785;
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 10, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328; Wagner v. Milwaukee
Cnty. Election Comm’n, 2003 WI 103, ¶ 18, 263 Wis. 2d 709, 666 N.W.2d 816; In re John Doe
Proceeding, 2003 WI 30, ¶ 27, 260 Wis. 2d 653, 660 N.W.2d 260; Vincent v. Voight, 2000 WI
93, ¶ 30, 236 Wis. 2d 588, 614 N.W.2d 388; State v. City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, ¶ 18, 232
Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526; Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 546 N.W.2d 123, 127
(1996); Polk Cnty. v. State Pub. Defender, 188 Wis. 2d 665, 674, 524 N.W.2d 389, 392 (1994);
State v. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d 352, 361, 441 N.W.2d 696, 699 (1989); Kukor v.
Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 485, 436 N.W.2d 568, 574 (1989); Beno, 116 Wis. 2d at 136–37;
Zweifel v. Joint Dist. No. 1, Belleville, 76 Wis. 2d 648, 657, 251 N.W.2d 822, 826 (1977); State
v. Burke, 2002 WI App 291, ¶ 4, 258 Wis. 2d 832, 653 N.W.2d 922; see also State v. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55, ¶ 209, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611 (Roggensack, J., dissenting); Kocken
v. Wis. Council 40, 2007 WI 72, ¶ 85, 301 Wis. 2d 266, 732 N.W.2d 828 (Roggensack, J., dissenting); State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 58, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (Prosser, J.,
concurring) (describing it as “a well-established methodology for interpreting provisions of
the Wisconsin Constitution.”); State ex rel. Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, 136 Wis. 2d 118,
165 n.3, 401 N.W.2d 782, 802 n.3 (1987) (Steinmetz, J., dissenting). But see State v. Williams,
2012 WI 59, ¶ 65, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (listing
the three sources, Chief Justice Abrahamson noted, “[t]his list of sources for or approaches to
constitutional interpretation is not exhaustive”).
36. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶ 117 (Prosser, J., dissenting); see also
Burke, 2002 WI App 291, ¶ 4 (“[W]e may not read our 1848 constitution using modern definitions and syntax.”).
37. See Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶¶ 120–21 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (quoting Noah Webster’s an American Dictionary); Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶ 65 (quoting
from Black’s Law Dictionary, Random House Unabridged Dictionary, and The American
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38

constitution, or earlier cases interpret the same words. At times, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court looks to the decisions of other state courts
when considering how to interpret words in the Wisconsin Constitu39
tion. In rare instances, a technical term is interpreted in line with its
40
technical definition.
When conducting a historical analysis of text from the 1848 constitution, the court continues to rely primarily on records from the drafting
41
conventions. The court may also consider contemporaneous practices
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Heritage Dictionary); Polk Cnty., 188 Wis. 2d at 676 (quoting from Black’s Law Dictionary);
Bd. of Educ. v. Sinclair, 65 Wis. 2d 179, 182, 222 N.W.2d 143, 145 (1974) (quoting from Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, unabridged).
38. City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, ¶ 20–24 (looking to earlier cases); Risser v. Klauser,
207 Wis. 2d 176, 199, 558 N.W.2d 108, 117 (1997) (“Although the interpretation of a word
used in a constitutional provision is not determinative of the word’s meaning in all constitutional provisions, it may prove helpful.”).
39. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 39 (“Our established constitutional analysis includes an examination of the practices in effect at the time the amendment was passed. Following the lead of
the legislature, we have looked to the practices and interpretations of other states.”); Jacobs
II, 139 Wis. 2d at 514–19 (looking at similar cases analyzing cognate provisions from California, Connecticut, Michigan, New York, and Washington). But see Wagner, 2003 WI 103, ¶ 54
(“The effort of tracing the evolution of these clauses in other states is not warranted, because,
as we have discussed, our state has its own constitutional history that developed the provision
we today examine.”).
40. State ex rel. Allis v. Wiesner, 187 Wis. 384, 394, 204 N.W. 589, 593 (1925) (“[W]here
technical terms were in use prior to the adoption of the constitution, such terms were used in
the constitution in the sense in which they were understood at common law.”); accord Mich.
Coal. of State Emp. Unions v Mich. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 634 N.W.2d 692, 698 (Mich. 2001)
(“[I]f a constitutional phrase is a technical legal term or a phrase of art in the law, the phrase
will be given the meaning that those sophisticated in the law understood at the time of enactment unless it is clear from the constitutional language that some other meaning was intended.”); cf State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110
(“[T]echnical or specially-defined words or phrases [in statutes] are given their technical or
special definitional meaning.” (citing Bruno v. Milwaukee Cty., 2003 WI 28, ¶¶ 8, 20, 260 Wis.
2d 663, 660 N.W.2d 656)).
41. Wagner, 2003 WI 103, ¶ 61 (“The debates are our best information about the practices at the time the constitution was adopted.”); City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, ¶ 27 (quoting
from drafters at the 1848 convention); Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 685–90, 546
N.W.2d 123, 129–31 (1996) (quoting from several different delegates to the 1846 and 1848
conventions); State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 140, 341 N.W.2d 668, 677 (1984) (“To help clarify the meaning of section 16 we look to the constitutional debates.”); Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis.
2d 550, 570–71, 247 N.W.2d 141, 150–51 (1976) (quoting Experience Estabrook, chairman of
the committee on education, during the convention’s debate on the education article); see also
In re Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, ¶¶ 75–78, 238 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110 (looking to two
early Wisconsin Supreme Court cases when the court’s membership included delegates to the
drafting convention); Jacobs I, 132 Wis. 2d 82, 100, 390 N.W.2d 86, 92 (Ct. App. 1986) (beginning by attempting, and failing, to find any “clues as to the source of or intent of the framers”
in the debates of the 1846 and 1848 conventions).
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42

in Wisconsin and other states.
When looking at amendments to the constitution rather than original text, the court considers legislative history from the amendment’s
drafting and passage through the legislature as well as popular history
43
from the statewide ratification campaign. Wisconsin has few sources of
legislative history because the legislature does not transcribe its floor
44
sessions or committee hearings. Sources of history used by courts in
constitutional cases include Legislative Council memoranda and re45
46
ports; Legislative Reference Bureau drafting files and analyses; analy-
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42. State v. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶¶ 18–22, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460 (describing
past practice on the federal level, in Wisconsin, and in Illinois); Wagner, 2003 WI 103, ¶¶ 123–
25 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (considering past practice in Wisconsin); id. ¶ 64 (majority opinion) (looking to an analogous provision from Illinois).
43. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶ 117, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719
N.W.2d 408 (“This principle permits courts to consider the debates surrounding amendments
to the constitution and the circumstances at the time these amendments were adopted. . . . These concerns are often illuminated by contemporary debates and explanations of
the provision both inside and outside legislative chambers.” (citations omitted)); Schilling v.
Wis. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2005 WI 17, ¶ 16, 278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 N.W.2d 623 (“We have
broadly understood the second of these sources, the constitutional debates and practices in
existence contemporaneous to the writing, to include the general history relating to a constitutional amendment, as well as the legislative history of the amendment.” (internal citations
omitted)).
44. MICHAEL J. KEANE, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, WIS. BRIEFS NO. 06-10,
RESEARCHING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN WISCONSIN 1 (July 2006), available at http://www.l
egis.state.wi.us/LRB/pubs/wb/06wb10.pdf. But see Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 69 (Abrahamson,
C.J., concurring) (listing thirteen different sources of history the court has available for statutory interpretation); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 999–1000 (4th ed. 2007)
[hereinafter ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION] (noting that state legislative history is becoming increasing accessible to lawyers and judges through online resources).
45. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶ 54 (considering a report by the Legislative Council); Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶ 32; State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 36 n.12, 264 Wis.
2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328 (“While the research done by [the Legislative Council and Legislative
Reference Bureau] is not necessarily dispositive in determining legislative intent, their analyses at the time of drafting certainly provides the court with valuable information about the
knowledge available to legislators. Further, the legal expertise of these agencies entitles their
analysis to some consideration by this court.”); Wagner, 2003 WI 103, ¶ 38 (considering a report by the Legislative Council); In re John Doe Proceeding, 2003 WI 30, ¶ 34, 260 Wis. 2d
653, 660 N.W.2d 260; Appling v. Doyle, 2013 WI App 3, ¶¶ 50, 52, 345 Wis. 2d 762, 826
N.W.2d 666; see also Jeffrey Monks, Comment, The End of Gun Control or Protection
Against Tyranny?: The Impact of the New Wisconsin Constitutional Right to Bear Arms on
State Gun Control Laws, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 249, 280 (2001) (“Because this [Legislative Council] memorandum was read by many legislators and is part of the amendment’s official drafting record, the conclusions in it should be considered a strong indicator of legislative intent.”).
46. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶ 51 (drafting files); Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI
107, ¶¶ 31–32 (drafting files); Schilling, 2005 WI 17, ¶¶ 22 & n.7 (analysis); Cole, 2003 WI
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47

sis by other legislative staffers; statements by sponsoring legislators and
48
other drafters and supporters; other sources used as models or exam49
50
ples by the drafters; opinions rendered by the attorney general; the
51
attorney general’s explanatory statement; and changes between ver52
sions of the amendment under legislative consideration, including ac53
cepted and rejected amendments. It is generally accepted that, in reviewing this history, the court should focus on statements by legislators
54
and advocates who framed and favored the amendment. This is so not
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112, ¶¶ 36 & n.12 (drafting files); Wagner, 2003 WI 103, ¶ 35 (analysis).
47. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶ 35 (citing a memorandum from the
Assembly Democratic Caucus deputy director).
48. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶¶ 49–51 (considering the report of the Governor’s Citizen
Study Commission on court reorganization); Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107,
¶ 210 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (quoting a news release from the governor who called the special session to pass the amendment); Schilling, 2005 WI 17, ¶ 22 (quoting a county supervisor
who was publicly supportive of the amendment); Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 64 (Prosser, J., concurring) (considering statements by sponsoring legislator); Wagner, 2003 WI 103, ¶ 62 (quoting
anonymous letters to the editor); Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 692, 546 N.W.2d 123,
132 (1996) (considering letters written by the superintendent of public instruction concerning
an amendment he drafted affecting the position); id. at 701–03 (Wilcox, J., concurring) (looking to additional letters from the superintendent); State ex rel. Swan v. Elections Bd., 133 Wis.
2d 87, 94–95, 394 N.W.2d 732, 735–36 (1986) (considering a passage from a treatise written by
two members of the Judicial Council concerning the court reorganization amendment); Appling, 2013 WI App 3, ¶¶ 49–55 (considering newspaper and press-release quotations from
sponsoring legislators); see also ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION, supra note 44, at 1018–19 (discussing the use of history generated by the executive branch, interest groups, and law-reform organizations).
49. Schilling, 2005 WI 17, ¶ 18 (citing two law review articles that accompanied the senator’s drafting request to the Legislative Reference Bureau); State v. City of Oak Creek, 2000
WI 9, ¶ 31, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526 (citing a statute known to have been used by the
revisor of Wisconsin’s statute).
50. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶ 34; id. ¶¶ 145–54, 229–30 (Prosser,
J., dissenting).
51. Wagner, 2003 WI 103, ¶¶ 36, 40.
52. Schilling, 2005 WI 17, ¶ 20; Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶¶ 67–68, 70–71 (Prosser, J., concurring).
53. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶¶ 216–20 (Prosser, J., dissenting);
Schilling, 2005 WI 17, ¶ 20; see also ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION, supra note 44, at 1026 (discussing use of rejected provisions as a type of legislative history). But see Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶ 28 n.27 (majority opinion) (“[T]he rejection of this amendment is only one act by the legislature, and does not outweigh the vast majority of other
legislative records and news reports . . . .”).
54. State ex rel. Martin v. Heil, 242 Wis. 41, 55, 7 N.W.2d 375, 381 (1942) (indicating that
the court should “find out, if possible, the real meaning and substantial purpose of those who
adopted it.” (emphasis added)); Appling v. Doyle, 2013 WI App 3, ¶ 44 n.10, 345 Wis. 2d 762,
826 N.W.2d 666 (agreeing with plaintiffs that “‘the views of an amendment’s proponents are
usually privileged over those of its opponents’” (quoting Martin, 242 Wis. 41 at 55)); id. ¶ 47
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only because opposing legislators and groups did not write the amendment, but because they had an incentive to distort its impact in their at55
tempt to defeat it.
The debates and explanations of the provision during the statewide
56
ratification campaign are also used to illuminate a clause. The court
operates on the presumption that, “when informed, the citizens of Wisconsin are familiar with the elements of the constitution and with the
laws, and that the information used to educate the voters during the rati57
fication campaign provides evidence of the voters’ intent.” To discern
the voters’ intent, the court uses several sources, primarily newspaper
58
59
60
stories, columns, and editorials. It has also looked at public opinion
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[I]t is a straightforward (albeit time-consuming) matter to reassemble newspaper
and other printed coverage after the fact. By contrast, tracking all media coverage—both print and electronic—would require a massive, ex ante campaign that
covered every moment and media source beginning some time well before the elec-
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(“[T]he more reasonable and obvious conclusion is that voters who ended up favoring the
amendment were, generally speaking, persuaded by statements of the proponents . . . .”); see
also id. ¶¶ 43–45 (mentioning that opponent statements are relevant only when they “reflect
a congruence of views or a common core understanding of the meaning or impact of the
amendment” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
55. Monks, supra note 45, at 293; see also ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION, supra note 44, at
1021 (“[S]tatements by legislators about bills they oppose are not reliable . . . .” (citing NLRB
v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964))). Compare Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v.
Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, 541 (Mich. 2008) (“[I]t is no more likely that the voters
relied on ‘proponents views rather than opponents’ views of the amendment.”), with id. at 548
n.35 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (“[I]n determining a law’s meaning, one logically assumes that the
statements of its drafters and lead supporters carry more weight than the concerns of those
who voted against it.”).
56. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶ 117 (Prosser, J., dissenting); see also
Cathy R. Silak, The People Act, the Courts React: A Proposed Model for Interpreting Initiatives in Idaho, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 37 (1996) (“It is the voters’ intent, not merely that of the
drafters or proponents of the initiative, that the court must ascertain.”). But see Glenn C.
Smith, Solving the “Initiatory Construction” Puzzle (and Improving Direct Democracy) by
Appropriate Refocusing on Sponsor Intent, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 257–59, 275 (2007) (arguing that courts should deemphasize voter intent and instead focus more on sponsor intent
when interpreting statewide initiatives).
57. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶ 37.
58. State v. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶ 53, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460 (citing a story
from the Wisconsin State Journal); Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶ 61 n.38
(quoting from a story in the Milwaukee Sentinel); id. ¶ 234 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (quoting
from stories in the Milwaukee Journal and Wisconsin State Journal); Appling, 2013 WI App 3,
¶ 58 (citing a supporter’s quote in a newspaper story). Admittedly, there are other news outlets than newspapers. However, “the print media generally supply the most extensive coverage” of these elections. See Joseph D. Kearney & Howard B. Eisenberg, The Print Media and
Judicial Elections: Some Case Studies from Wisconsin, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 593, 596 (2002).
Moreover,
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61

polling from the ratification campaign.
In all events, “[t]he framers’ intent . . . has special significance when
we are dealing with a matter which was demonstrably contemplated by
62
the framers.” Similarly, the court may also consider whether there exists “a long-standing, uniform and continuous interpretation of a constitutional provision” that stretches from the provision’s proposal to the
63
present.
Looking to contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous legislative
constructions of an amendment is usually straightforward. “The legislature’s subsequent actions are a crucial component of any constitutional
analysis because they are clear evidence of the legislature’s understand64
ing of that amendment.”
This entire interpretive enterprise is undertaken seeking “to give effect to the intent of the framers and of the people who adopted
it . . . [and to construe it] so as to promote the objects for which [it was]
65
framed and adopted.” This section has traced the historical evolution
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s approach to interpretation of the
state constitution, from the framing era through the Busé framework in
modern times.
III. THE WEAKNESS OF THE COURT’S CURRENT METHOD
The second prong of the Busé methodology looks at history from the
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tion and lasting right up to it.
Id. at 597. But see Appling, 2013 WI App 3, ¶¶ 59–60 (quoting from the website of an
amendment supporter, then quoting from a television appearance by another amendment
supporter).
59. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶¶ 40–41 (quoting from a letter to
the editor by two senators published in the Milwaukee Journal and a column by a Wisconsin
State Journal writer); Appling, 2013 WI App 3, ¶ 58 (quoting from a newspaper op-ed by an
amendment supporter published in a University of Wisconsin–Madison student newspaper).
60. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶¶ 41–42 (quoting from editorials in
the Wisconsin State Journal, Eau Claire Leader Telegram, and Green Bay Press Gazette).
61. Id. ¶ 43; State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶ 144, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting); State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 44, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d
328; see also Monks, supra note 45, at 284 n.195.
62. State v. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d 352, 362, 441 N.W.2d 696, 699 (1989).
63. Id. at 362.
64. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶ 45; see also State v. Williams, 2012
WI 59, ¶ 55, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460 (considering legislation passed in the session
immediately following the amendment’s passage).
65. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 10 (quoting Kayden Indus., Inc. v. Murphy, 34 Wis. 2d 718,
729–30, 150 N.W.2d 447, 452 (1967)).
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amendment’s passage through two sessions of the legislature and from
66
the statewide ratification campaign. Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson, in her concurring opinion in Kalal, wrote, “Legislative history, especially legislative committee reports and the congressional record, has
gotten a bad reputation in recent years in federal circles because legislative history may be manufactured by both proponents and opponents of
67
the legislation . . . .” Although she tries to reassure us that the “manufacturing of legislative history is a less well-known and less perfected
68
skill” in Wisconsin, she provides no support to justify her distinction
between federal legislative history, which she poo-poos, and state legislative history, which she positively advocates. Ken Dortzbach observed
in 1996 that “state courts do not hear as many politically-charged cases[,] which typically lend themselves to abuse or misuse of legislative
69
history.” Since he wrote that, the court has used legislative history
when deciding major constitutional cases dealing with gun rights and
70
gambling, and it may soon do so regarding same-sex unions. These
hot-button issues requiring interpretation of relatively recent amendments offer interested parties the opportunity and incentive to manufacture and manipulate legislative history.
Courts’ experience with federal legislative history provides insight
into the dangers Wisconsin courts can expect. First, Judge Ken Starr has
said that “technocrats, lobbyists and attorneys have created a virtual
cottage industry in fashioning legislative history so that the Congress
71
will appear to embrace their particular view in a given statute.” Admittedly, not as much legislative history comes out of the state legisla72
ture, but the possibility and incentives are certainly present for legisla-
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66. Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 568–70, 247 N.W.2d 141, 149–51 (1976).
67. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 66, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d
110 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
68. Id. ¶ 67.
69. Kenneth R. Dortzbach, Legislative History: The Philosophies of Justices Scalia and
Breyer and the Use of Legislative History by the Wisconsin State Courts, 80 MARQ. L. REV.
161, 201 (1996).
70. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶¶ 195–96, 295 Wis. 2d 1,
719 N.W.2d 408 (discussing gambling); Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 20 (discussing gun rights); Appling v. Doyle, 2013 WI App 3, ¶ 11, 345 Wis. 2d 762, 826 N.W.2d 666 (discussing same-sex
unions).
71. Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE
L.J. 371, 377; see also ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION, supra note 44, at 983 (discussing the “smuggling in” problem presented by committee reports); id. at 1000–01 (discussing intentionally
distortionary sponsor statements).
72. KEANE, supra note 44, at 1.
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tors, staff, and lobbyists to mold that which does exist in a particular direction.
Second, once the legislation is passed and its history made, then lawyers and judges are tempted to “find[] in the legislative history only that
73
for which one is looking.” Thus, as Chief Justice Abrahamson observed in Mortier v. Town of Casey, a judge’s use of legislative history
74
“is akin to ‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.’” She
quoted approvingly from an opinion by Judge Alex Kozinski: “[T]he
fact of the matter is that legislative history can be cited to support al75
most any proposition, and frequently is.” She reiterated this point in
Kalal, observing that “often every position can be buttressed by some76
thing in the federal legislative history.” And she returned to it nearly a
decade later in State v. Williams: “[T]here are often different historical
narratives, and there is the ever-present danger that history can be read
77
selectively to support a particular result.”
The third problem with legislative history is that even for those
without an agenda, simply sorting through it can be a complicated task,
and those who undertake the analysis dispassionately often end up with
78
conflicting, vague, or otherwise inconclusive history. Justices can and
often do disagree about the proper implications of legislative history
79
when interpreting a constitutional or statutory provision.
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73. Starr, supra note 71, at 376. The majority focused on different reasons to oppose
legislative history, but did note that more extensive use of legislative history “renders the
analysis more vulnerable to subjectivity.” State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58,
¶ 49 n.8, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.
74. Mortier v. Town of Casey, 154 Wis. 2d 18, 39, 452 N.W.2d 555, 564 (1990) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (quoting Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983)); ESKRIDGE,
LEGISLATION, supra note 44, at 972–73; see also Noffke v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, ¶ 60, 315 Wis.
2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (“Thus resort to a dictionary can be,
as Justice Scalia has written of the use of legislative history, ‘the equivalent of entering a
crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one’s friends.’” (citing
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
75. Mortier, 154 Wis. 2d at 39–40 (quoting Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559
(9th Cir. 1986)).
76. Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 66 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
77. State v. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶ 85, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460 (Abrahamson,
C.J., concurring).
78. Starr, supra note 71, at 378–79.
79. See, e.g., Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶¶ 225–34, 295
Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority on how to
read legislative history regarding the lottery amendments); Wagner v. Milwaukee Cnty. Election Comm’n, 2003 WI 103, ¶¶ 89–91, 94–95, 100, 105–07, 263 Wis. 2d 709, 666 N.W.2d 816
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Fourth, the use of legislative history to discern the “intent” of the
legislative body operates on the mistaken assumption that a single, unified intent exists. Yet this is plainly not so, whether the body under examination is the U.S. Congress with its 535 members or the Wisconsin
Legislature with its 132. In either instance, “A legislature certainly has
no intention whatever in connection with words which some two or
three men drafted, which a considerable number rejected, and in regard
to which many of the approving majority might have had, and often de80
monstrably did have, different ideas and beliefs.” Numerous diverse
interests drive legislators to cast their individual votes on a particular
81
bill. No number of committee reports or floor speeches will prove
what a majority of the body believed or intended at the time the bill was
82
passed —only the law itself was the subject of agreement.
Taking all this into account, Chief Justice Abrahamson concluded in
Mortier that “[c]ourts must use federal legislative history with healthy
83
skepticism.” The same should be said of legislative history from the
Wisconsin Legislature.
A healthy skepticism should also characterize a court’s approach to
popular history from the statewide ratification campaign. Popular history suffers the same four flaws as legislative history. First, it can be strategically created during the campaign to influence later judicial interpre-
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(Bradley, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority on how to read statements from delegates to the constitutional conventions); Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 701–05, 546
N.W.2d 123, 135–37 (1996) (Wilcox, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority on how to
read several letters by the drafter of a constitutional amendment); Grosse v. Protective Life
Ins. Co., 182 Wis. 2d 97, 117–20, 513 N.W.2d 592, 601–02 (1994) (Steinmetz, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with the majority on how to read legislative history from the state legislature);
Mortier, 154 Wis. 2d at 41–44 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority on
how to read legislative history from Congress). See generally Dortzbach, supra note 69, at
201–21 (examining conflicting use of legislative history by majority, concurring, and dissenting
justices within various cases).
80. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930); see also Jane
S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105
YALE L.J. 107, 123 (1995) (“Dating to the work of Max Radin, intent-based statutory interpretation has been the subject of continuous scholarly derision.”).
81. Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History Be an Impeachable Offense?, 31
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 813 (1998); see also ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION, supra note 44, at 54–
60 (discussing public-choice theory, log-rolling, and coalition creation); Clifford J. Carrubba
& Craig Volden, Coalitional Politics and Logrolling in Legislative Institutions, 44 AM. J. OF
POLITICAL SCI. 261, 262 (2000).
82. Especially because committee and conference reports are usually written by staff and
only represent the views of the chairman of the committee or conference from which they
emerge, not the legislative body as a whole. Starr, supra note 71, at 375–76 & n.14.
83. Mortier, 154 Wis. 2d at 40 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
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84

tation.
Second, it can be sifted through or manipulated by an advocate or
85
judge to support his or her preferred outcome in a case. If substantial
legislative history is available for an average bill in Congress, imagine
the amount of popular history generated by a yearlong statewide campaign across Wisconsin, a state with thirty-one daily newspapers, scores
of other newspapers and magazines, hundreds of television and radio
86
87
outlets, and multi-million dollar campaigns.
Third, even well-meaning people will likely find much of the popular
88
history confusing or in conflict with itself. As Professor Jane Schacter,
writing while a member of the University of Wisconsin law faculty, has
argued, “Judicial immersion in the unwieldy body of images, words, and
political slogans that may comprise the media coverage and advertising
related to a ballot measure is likely to intensify, not reduce, the problems of indeterminacy that already undermine the search for popular in89
tent.” It may also be that the popular history was distorted by political
forces trying to shape, or misshape, voters’ perception of the amend90
ment.
Fourth and finally, this endeavor starts from the flawed assumption
91
that popular history can provide a guide to the “intent” of the voters.
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84. Schacter, supra note 80, at 145 (“[A]ssigning a central place to media sources invites
strategic behavior on the part of partisans in the initiative battle, such as attempts to fill the
airwaves and the larger public record with characterizations and claims intended to influence
subsequent judicial interpretation.”).
85. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Uses of State Constitutional History: A Case Note, 53
ALB. L. REV. 283, 283 (1989).
86. WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN BLUE
BOOK 2011–2012, at 770–84 (2011) (listing media outlets in Wisconsin).
87. See, e.g., Groups that Weighed in On the 2006 Fall Referendum Questions,
WISCONSIN DEMOCRACY CAMPAIGN (Oct. 31, 2007), http://www.wisdc.org/referendumgrou
ps2006.php (estimating that groups for and against the Wisconsin Marriage Amendment
spent over $5 million to affect the statewide ratification referendum).
88. Silak, supra note 56, at 41 (“Despite a court’s careful attention to all the extrinsic
aids . . . the intent behind an initiative may remain obscure.”).
89. Schacter, supra note 80, at 144.
90. Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, 542 n.24 (Mich.
2008) (“It perhaps can also be discerned that supporters of legislative and constitutional initiatives often tend to downplay the effect of such initiatives during public debate, while opponents tend to overstate their effect.”).
91. Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
17, 18 (1997) (“[I]t seems unlikely that judges can accurately discern the ‘popular intent’ or
even that such a clear, monolithic intent actually exists.”); id. at 28 (“There is no principled
way to impute a clear, consistent, or illuminating intent to the electorate.”); Schacter, supra
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As Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas wryly observed,
“[I]nquiries into legislative intent are even more difficult than usual
when the legislative body whose unified intent must be determined con92
sists of 825,162 Arkansas voters.”
In addition to these four problems, popular history from ratification
campaigns faces its own unique problems. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court relies primarily on newspaper reports, columns, and editorials for
the popular history of the ratification campaign. Yet, especially in an
era where newspapers are in decline, the reality is that television and
radio advertising “take[] on greater importance as the primary means of
93
voter persuasion.” But even if the court were to start looking at cam94
paign ads and materials as part of its analysis, it would find that they
are “frequently too diffuse, disparate, indeterminate, or biased to be ef95
fective as judicial sources of popular intent.” Moreover, these campaign materials rarely “traffic in ‘the arcane, albeit potent, details’ of the
96
initiatives they tout or disparage.”
Courts in Wisconsin and elsewhere have recognized the problems
inherent in reliance on popular history to discern voter intent. The Supreme Court of Missouri, for instance, has labeled “representations
made here and there at large over the state by private individuals and
organizations in advocacy of a cause at an election” as “neither conclu97
sive nor persuasive evidence” for interpretation. The Supreme Court
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note 80, at 111 (“First, the popular intent behind an initiative statute is largely illusory and
provides an unstable anchor for judicial interpretation.”); id. at 124–25 (“[T]he problem of
aggregating multiple individual intentions, substantial as it is in the context of the legislative
process, is compounded by the daunting scale of direct lawmaking. Even if we granted that
individual voter intent existed—a dubious premise, I will argue—courts simply could not cumulate what may be millions of voter intentions.”). Thus, courts which seek “some mean intent of the average reasonable informed voter” rely on a “misguided faith.” Stephen Salvucci, Note, Say What You Mean and Mean What You Say: The Interpretation of Initiatives in
California, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 871, 877 (1998). Professor Smith finds a “clear consensus of
initiatory-construction scholarship” that the search for an “intent of the voters” is “fundamentally bankrupt” because this mythical intent “does not exist.” Smith, supra note 56, at
258.
92. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 921 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
93. Silak, supra note 56, at 31; see also Schacter, supra note 80, at 131, 135.
94. As has been suggested by Christopher R. McFadden, Article, The Wisconsin Bear
Arms Amendment and the Case Against an Absolute Prohibition on Carrying Concealed
Weapons, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 709, 711 (1999).
95. Schacter, supra note 80, at 130; see also Silak, supra note 56, at 29 (“As with any advertising campaign, the meaning and effect of an initiative can be subject to distortion.”).
96. Smith, supra note 56, at 275 (quoting Schacter, supra note 80, at 158).
97. State ex rel. Russell v. State Highway Comm’n, 42 S.W.2d 196, 202 (Mo. 1931); see
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of Arkansas followed a similar rule, reasoning,
When the debates arose over the question of adoption by the
people, the amendment had already been framed by the Legislature and referred to the people; and the opinions expressed during the progress of the campaign did not enter into the shaping of
the language of the amendment, so as to shed light on its intend98
ed meaning.
Chief Justice Nathan Heffernan, writing for the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, similarly declined to ascribe any significance to a brief written by
the chief of the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Library in support of a
proposed amendment, saying:
[W]e question whether contemporaneously written briefs aimed
at garnering political support for a proposed constitutional
amendment can ever be considered persuasive when a court later
attempts to interpret the constitutional provision that was
amended. Even if Witte could accurately be called the drafter of
this amendment, the amendment to the constitution was accomplished in the usual manner, including passage by two successive
legislatures and approval and ratification by the people of Wisconsin at the general election. Thus, unlike the situation where
the court must ascertain legislative intent for a statutory enactment, this contemporaneously written account of what Witte
thought the proposed constitutional amendment meant, is not
99
persuasive as to what the amendment actually did.
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also St. Louis Cnty. v. State Highway Comm’n, 409 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Mo. 1966); Missourians
for Honest Elections v. Mo. Elections Comm’n, 536 S.W.2d 766, 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
98. Hodges v. Dawdy, 149 S.W. 656, 659 (Ark. 1912); see also ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION,
supra note 44, at 1035–43 (discussing post-enactment legislative history).
99. State ex rel. Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 461 n.18, 424 N.W.2d 385,
397 n.18 (1988) (citations omitted).
100. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶ 43, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719
N.W.2d 408; State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 44, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328; State v.
Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶ 144, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting); see also Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, 547–48 (Mich.
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Today’s Wisconsin courts would be wise to recall Chief Justice Heffernan’s words, and those of other state high courts, in rejecting the use
of popular history as a first resort for interpretation.
In addition to newspaper stories, the other place the court has
looked when discerning the intent of the voters is public opinion poll100
ing. The experience of the U.S. Supreme Court in citing opinion polls

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 60 Side A

01/13/2014 11:22:05

SUHR 10 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

12/3/2013 2:00 PM

INTERPRETING THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION

111

reveals the significant problems with judicial reliance on unexamined
survey data. In Atkins v. Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court’s majority
opinion mentioned in a footnote “polling data show[ing] a widespread
consensus among Americans, even those who support the death penalty,
101
that executing the mentally retarded is wrong.” Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, in dissent, gave a critique of polling data that the Wisconsin
Supreme Court should carefully consider:
An extensive body of social science literature describes how
methodological and other errors can affect the reliability and validity of estimates about the opinions and attitudes of a population derived from various sampling techniques. Everything from
variations in the survey methodology, such as the choice of the
target population, the sampling design used, the questions asked,
and the statistical analyses used to interpret the data can skew
102
the results.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also noted that in a previous decision involving the death penalty, the Court had refused to “rest constitutional law
103
upon such uncertain foundations as public opinion polls.” In another
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2008) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (discussing a poll on domestic-partnership benefits and same-sex
marriage taken in advance of Michigan’s statewide vote on a constitutional amendment);
Cnty. of Kenosha v. C & S Mgmt., Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 373, 407–13, 588 N.W.2d 236, 252–55
(1999) (setting standards of evidence for the admission of polling data to show “community
standards of decency” in obscenity cases); Monks, supra note 45, at 284 n.195.
101. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 n.21 (2002) (citing Brief of Am. Ass’n on Mental Retardation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support for Petitioner at 3a–7a, McCarver v. North
Carolina, 548 S.E.2d 522 (N.C. 2001), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 533 U.S. 975
(2001) (No. 00-1015) (appending approximately twenty state and national polls on the issue),
also appended to Atkins, 536 U.S. at 328–37 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
102. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 326–27 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice further
noted that while criteria exist to determine whether surveys possess sufficient scientific merit
to justify their use in court, they ought to be introduced at the trial court level where the pollsters can be credentialed as experts, examined, and cross-examined. Id. at. 327–28. Instead,
these polls were submitted as part of an amicus brief, which may raise concerns that the amicus filer was using the polling to advance an agenda. See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig,
The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L.
REV. 91, 97 (1993) (examining problems caused by amicus practice). For a broader discussion of the Chief Justice’s concerns about polling methodology, see Tracy E. Robinson, By
Popular Demand? The Supreme Court’s Use of Public Opinion Polls in Atkins v. Virginia, 14
GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 107, 121–37 (2004). For a defense of polling in reply to the
Chief Justice’s concerns, see David Niven, Jeremy Zilber & Kenneth W. Miller, A “Feeble
Effort to Fabricate National Consensus”: The Supreme Court’s Measurement of Current Social
Attitudes Regarding the Death Penalty, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 83, 84–85 (2006).
103. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 326 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989)); see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 352 n.5 (1976) (White,
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death-penalty case, the Court noted but declined to rely on public opinion polling, saying, “The public sentiment expressed in these and other
polls and resolutions may ultimately find expression in legislation, which
is an objective indicator of contemporary values upon which we can re104
ly.” The text of the amendment that voters approved is the “objective
indicator” of the desires of the people, not opinion polling.
Moreover, the reliability of the pollsters that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court has relied upon in the past is widely questioned by expert observers of Wisconsin politics. In Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., the court
cited polls by St. Norbert College (SNC)/Wisconsin Public Radio and
105
In State v. Cole and State v.
the University of Wisconsin Extension.
Hamdan, the justices looked to two polls sponsored by the Public Policy
106
Forum, a non-profit think tank based in Milwaukee.
The publicly
available polling data on the marriage amendment and its impact on civil unions, cited by then-Attorney General Peg Lautenschlager and University of Wisconsin (UW) Law Professor David Schwartz in their opin107
ion letters on domestic partnerships, come from SNC and the UW
108
Madison Survey Center (UWSC).
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J., dissenting) (“[N]either the parties here nor amici rely on such polls as relevant to the issue
before us.”).
104. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334–35 (1989).
105. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc., 2006 WI 107, ¶ 43.
106. State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶ 144, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting); State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 44, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328; see
also Monks, supra note 45, at 284 n.196 (mentioning Public Policy Forum’s role in conducting
polls).
107. Letter from Peggy A. Lautenschlager, Attorney Gen., Wis. Dep’t of Justice, to Michael P. May, City Attorney, City of Madison, 5 (last visited Oct. 17, 2013), www.news.wisc.ed
u/domesticPartnerBenefits/images/AGOpinion.pdf; Letter from David S. Schwartz, Professor
of Law, Univ. of Wis. Law Sch., to James E. Doyle, Governor, State of
Wis., 6 (June 4, 2009), http://web.archive.org/web/20090822184959/http://www.wisgov.state.wi.
us/docview.asp?docid=17476 (accessed by entering URL in the Internet Archive).
108. G. Donald Ferree, Jr., Univ. of Wis. Survey Ctr., Badger Poll No. 14, Release No. 5,
Courts, Homosexuality, and Gay Marriage, 6–8 (Apr. 12, 2004), http://www.uwsc.wisc.
edu/badg145.pdf; G. Donald Ferree, Jr., Univ. of Wis. Survey Ctr., Badger Poll No. 10, Release No. 6, Homosexuality and the Law: The View from Wisconsin, 5–9 (Sept. 19, 2003),
http://www.uwsc.wisc.edu/badg106.pdf.; Wendy Scattergood, St. Norbert Coll. Survey Ctr.,
Gay Marriage and Civil Unions, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Spring 2006), http://www.wpr.org/aprilgay-marriage-civil-unions-2006; Katherine Cramer Walsh, Univ. of Wis. Survey Ctr., Badger
Poll No. 22, Release No. 3, Same Sex Marriage, Unions, and Referendum, 1–2 (July 17, 2006),
http://www.uwsc.wisc.edu/BP22PressRelease_Death_Samesex.pdf; Katherine Cramer Walsh,
Univ. of Wis. Survey Ctr., Badger Poll No. 23, Release No. 1, Wisconsin Statewide Elections
November 2006, 18, 30 (Oct. 30, 2006), http://www.uwsc.wisc.edu/BP23PressRelease1_WIr
aces_111406.pdf. The October 2006 polling memorandum from UWSC references polls taken
in December 2003 and January 2005, but the full results from those polls are not available on
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Each of these polls surveyed Wisconsin residents generally, not reg109
istered or likely voters.
Marquette Law School Professor Charles
Franklin distinguishes the two, saying that a poll of residents is “a sample that is most representative of the state but not necessarily repre110
Critiquing a similar poll, longtime
sentative of November voters.”
Wisconsin Democratic political consultant Bill Christofferson wrote sarcastically, “It is customary, when doing a poll to try to find out what’s
happening in an election campaign, to ask people who actually intend to
111
vote.” It is also the goal of the court to find out what the voters, and
not merely the people who lived in the state, believed about an amend112
ment at referendum.
Second, Wisconsin college polls usually are in
the field for eleven or twelve days, while professional polls generally
113
take two or three. Mr. Christofferson said one such poll was “a little
114
suspect because [it was] done over a long period of time.” Third, because they try to keep costs down, college polls often use relatively small
115
sample sizes, resulting in such wide margins of error that Mr. Christof-
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the UWSC website.
109. See John Patrick Hunter, Survey: Taxes Top Worry, Gaming Views Split, CAPITAL
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1993, at 3A (SNC and UW Extension polls); Jim Stingl, Gun Amendment
Favored by 80% in State, but Only 16% Would Back Law on Carrying Concealed Weapons,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 25, 1998, at 1A (discussing Public Policy Forum polls); see
also supra note 108 (demonstrating survey methodology of marriage amendment polls).
110. Charles Franklin, When the Pollsters Matter Most: WI Gov 06, POLITICAL
ARITHMETIK (July 1, 2006, 11:35 AM), http://politicalarithmetik.blogspot.com/2006/07/whenpollster-matters-most-wi-gov-06.html.
111. Hey, Kids, Let’s Do a Poll!, THE XOFF FILES BY BILL CHRISTOFFERSON (Apr. 14,
2006, 9:01 AM), http://www.wisopinion.com/blogs/2006/04/hey-kids-lets-do-poll.html.
112. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶¶ 37–44, 295 Wis. 2d 1,
719 N.W.2d 408 (considering perspective of voters when analyzing intent).
113. Daniel, Most Recent Badger Poll Miserably Flawed, GOP3.COM: THE
TRIUMVIRATE (July 12, 2006, 11:17 PM), http://web.archive.org/web/20070611101404/http://g
op3.com/2006/07/12/badger-poll-timed-trash/ (accessed by entering URL in the Internet Archive) (comparing four Wisconsin college polls with twelve professional polls taken in Wisconsin).
114. Another Day, Another Poll, THE XOFF FILES BY BILL CHRISTOFFERSON (Nov. 16,
2005, 11:16 AM), http://www.wisopinion.com/blogs/2005/11/another-day-another-poll.html;
see also THE XOFF FILES BY BILL CHRISTOFFERSON, Hey, Kids, Let’s Do a Poll!, supra note
111 (saying a SNC poll gives us “blurry photos at best”).
115. See A Poll You Can Safely Ignore, THE XOFF FILES BY BILL CHRISTOFFERSON
(Dec. 10, 2005, 11:57 AM), http://www.wisopinion.com/blogs/2005/12/poll-you-can-safelyignore.html (describing a small sample used by Edgewood College as “not enough to tell you
anything meaningful”); Franklin, supra note 110 (saying the SNC poll uses “small samples”);
Nate Silver, Today’s Polls: Alaska!, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 10, 2008, 4:15 PM),
http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2008/04/todays-polls-alaska.html (giving “appropriately low
weighting” to a SNC poll because it “consists of a small sample of just 400 adults (not even
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ferson labeled one SNC poll “basically a disservice to any rational polit116
ical discussion.” In light of these faults, Mr. Christofferson has criticized the Wisconsin media because they “usually treat all polls equally—
one taken by a college class is as good as one taken by one of the coun117
try’s top political pollsters.” In the past, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
118
has looked to polls taken by a college class; it should not do so in the
future.
Rather than using college polls with significant reliability issues, the
court may be tempted to look at professional polls done by organizations interested in a referendum. These polls, after all, usually have
larger samples, screen for likely voters, and are taken over industry119
But the court should avoid these polls as
standard polling windows.
well, for three reasons. First, groups interested in the outcome of a referendum have a strong incentive to ask the question in such a way as to
lead respondents to a desired answer. A poll that exaggerates support
for the group’s position may be used to create a “bandwagon” effect
120
Second,
that helps in the poll that really matters on Election Day.
these groups only publicly release polls that show good results; no candidate ever gave the media a poll showing him or her getting crushed.
Third, these releases often offer only broad descriptions and bare de121
tails—not question wording or order.
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registered voters)”); see also John McAdams, Current St. Norbert College Poll: Good News
for Democrats, MARQUETTE WARRIOR (Oct. 20, 2006, 2:03 PM), http://muwarriorblogspot.com/20 06/10/current-st-norbert-college-poll-good.html (questioning whether
the SNC sample has a bias).
116. Margin of Error Leads all Candidates, THE XOFF FILES BY BILL CHRISTOFFERSON
(Apr. 12, 2006, 11:21 AM), http://www.wisopinion.com/blogs/2006/04/margin-of-error-leadsall-candidates.html; see also Candidates, Stop Campaigning! Poll Says You’re Going Backwards, UPPITY WISCONSIN, (July 15, 2010, 3:11 PM), http://uppitywis.org/candidates-stopcampaigning-poll-says-youre-going-backwards (“[The UWSC poll] was conducted over a
month’s time, and only 300 likely voters were interviewed, for starters. It simply is not credible.”).
117. Beware of Candidates Bearing Polls, THE XOFF FILES BY BILL CHRISTOFFERSON
(May
3, 2005, 10:15 AM), http://www.wisopinion.com/blogs/2005/05/beware-of-candidatesbearing-polls.html; see generally Andrew Alexander, Margin for Error in Reporting on Polls,
WASH. POST, July 26, 2009, at A17.
118. See supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text.
119. Nate Silver, Methodology, FIVE THIRTY EIGHT, (Oct. 10, 2013), http://fivethirt
yeight.blogs.nytimes.com/methodology/.
120. Albert Mehrabian, Effects of Poll Reports on Voter Preferences, 28 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 2119, 2119 (1998).
121. See Beware of Candidates Bearing Polls, THE XOFF FILES BY BILL
CHRISTOFFERSON, supra note 117 (“[T]he media would be well advised to be much more
skeptical when it is given part of a candidate’s poll. The Walker memo is typical. It shares a
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few selected pieces of good news for Walker from a long questionnaire that asked all sorts of
other things they are not telling us about.”).
122. Judith Davidoff, Benefit Brawl, CAPITAL TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, at 10.
123. Jack Craver, Gay Rights Go Mainstream Here, ISTHMUS, July 9, 2010, at 6.
124. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 327 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
125. Beware of Candidates Bearing Polls, THE XOFF FILES BY BILL CHRISTOFFERSON,
supra note 117.
126. See Appling v. Doyle, 2013 WI App 3, ¶¶ 70–73, 345 Wis. 2d 762, 826 N.W.2d 666
(declining to resolve the question of how a changed legislative majority affects the analysis of
contemporaneous legislation).
127. S. J. Res. 53, 2005–2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2006) (listing sponsoring senators);
Assemb. J. Res. 66, 2003–2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2003) (listing sponsoring assemblypersons).
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A poll by Fair Wisconsin, the group that opposed the Wisconsin
Marriage Amendment, illustrates these problems well. After Governor
Doyle released his 2009 budget, which included a domestic-partnership
registry for same-sex couples, Fair Wisconsin touted a poll it sponsored
on that topic: “[T]he survey found that 77 percent of Wisconsin voters
support some recognition of gay couples. Only 20 percent felt that
‘there should be no legal recognition of a relationship between gay and
122
lesbian couples.’” It would be a significant mistake for a court to consider such a poll as evidence when deciding the “voter intent” behind
the Wisconsin Marriage Amendment. The question was worded in such
a way as to elicit a particular response that would allow Fair Wisconsin
to do exactly what it did: push the poll in news stories as evidence of
123
widespread support for the Governor’s domestic-partnership proposal.
Chief Justice Rehnquist rightly pointed out that a poll’s sponsorship can
124
“bear on the objectivity of the results.” To paraphrase Mr. Christof125
ferson’s advice: “Beware of [litigants and amici] bearing polls!”
In sum, polling is a complicated endeavor. As the foregoing section
has illustrated, a number of methodological questions must be asked to
determine the quality of a poll. Courts, especially those on the appellate
level, do not possess the necessary expertise to parse polling data. Judges are not pollsters, and they should not pretend to be. Nor should they
use survey data to reinterpret the meaning of the text that the voters
approved in the only poll that matters: the ratification vote on election
day.
Finally, near-contemporaneous legislative enactments may be a poor
126
The Wisguide when seeking the intent of the enacting legislature.
consin Marriage Amendment, for instance, was sponsored by Republi127
cans in the legislature. It passed two successive sessions because Re-
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128. Wis. S. J. Res. 53 (approving the proposed amendment on second consideration and
submitting it to the people for referendum); Wis. Assemb. J. Res. 66 (approving the proposed
amendment and referring it to the 2005–2006 legislature).
129. Bill Glauber, State Voters Say ‘I Do’ to Marriage Amendment, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Nov. 8, 2006, at 9A.
130. Patrick Marley & Larry Sandler, Lehman, Sullivan Lead Takeover for Democrats,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 8, 2006, at 10A.
131. Steven Walters & Patrick Marley, Democrats Face Election Reality Check,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 7, 2008, at 1B.
132. See 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 773 (codified as amended at WIS. STAT. § 40.02(20) (2011–
2012) (including domestic partners in definition of “dependent” under the public employee
trust fund)); see also id. § 3218 (codified at WIS. STAT. §§ 770.001–770.18) (requiring that
county clerk keep “declaration of domestic partnership docket”).
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publicans in control of the Assembly and Senate scheduled the measure
128
and saw to its passage. The people of Wisconsin ratified the amend129
ment in the fall 2006 general election. On that very same day, voters
130
elected a Democratic majority to the state senate. Obviously, voters’
general preference for Democrats did not include a specific preference
for that party’s stance on the marriage amendment. Two years later,
Wisconsinites elected a Democratic majority in the state assembly while
131
retaining the senate majority. With the governorship also in hand, the
new majorities passed a state budget that included domestic-partner
benefits for state employees and a statewide domestic-partnership regis132
Should these actions, taken only three years after the amendtry.
ment’s passage, guide the court in applying its language? Obviously not.
The legislature that passed those budget provisions was substantially different from the one that passed the amendment—many members had
turned over, and more importantly, majority control of both houses had
changed parties. This example illustrates that changing circumstances
may make near-contemporaneous legislative decisions an unreliable
guide for interpreting constitutional provisions.
In sum, the court’s current methodology for interpreting constitutional provisions relies on flawed sources. Legislative history can be
abused by those who write it in an attempt to shape the interpretation of
the law, and by those using it in court, who may select nonrepresentative or misleading sources. Even when honestly evaluated,
legislative history can be confusing and inconsistent. Additionally, the
entire project begins from the false premise that a unified intent can be
divined from anything other than the words that the majority agreed to
enact.
Recent scholarship has shown that popular history from the
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statewide ratification campaign suffers these same flaws. Popular history that relies on newspaper clippings, moreover, prioritizes a source that
is quickly losing relevance over a source that affects many more voters—namely, campaign advertising. Yet this source too has problems as
an interpretive guide. The court’s other source of voter intent, public
opinion polling, varies widely in quality, precision, and objectivity—
making it an unreliable signpost for the court. All of these concerns
should lead the Wisconsin Supreme Court to stop its current ritual of
examining the entrails of a provision’s history when the text is unambiguous.
IV. THE CASE FOR INTERPRETIVE CONSISTENCY
Rather than focus on concerns about intent-based interpretation like
those outlined above, the Kalal majority sought to advance positive
goods associated with the rule of law through its insistence on a text-first
133
approach to statutory interpretation. The majority believed that “[a]n
interpretive method that focuses on textual, intrinsic sources of statutory
meaning and cabins the use of extrinsic sources of legislative intent is
grounded in more than a mistrust of legislative history or cynicism about
134
the capacity of the legislative or judicial processes to be manipulated.”
Rather, “[t]he principles of statutory interpretation that we have restat135
ed here are rooted in and fundamental to the rule of law.”
What are these “rule of law” values advanced by the majority’s textualism? The court turned to the nation’s foremost champion of textualist interpretation, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, to explain:
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133. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶ 45, 52, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681
N.W.2d 110.
134. Id. ¶ 52.
135. Id.; see also In re Commitment of Gilbert, 2012 WI 72, ¶ 28 n.11, 342 Wis. 2d 82, 816
N.W.2d 215 (“The dissent . . . undertakes an analysis that is representative of the precise evil
that Kalal was designed to combat: the use of legislative history in lieu of the language of the
statute.”).
136. Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 52 (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF

34306-mqt_97-1 Sheet No. 63 Side A

Ours is “a government of laws not men,” and “it is simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with
fair government, to have the meaning of a law determined by
what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver
promulgated.” “It is the law that governs, not the intent of the
lawgiver. . . . Men may intend what they will; but it is only the
136
laws that they enact which bind us.”
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Justice Scalia has made the same point elsewhere in a pithier manner:
137
“[W]e are a Government of laws, not of committee reports.”
The Kalal majority briefly referenced two other arguments for its
method. First, “[j]udicial deference to the policy choices enacted into
law by the legislature requires that statutory interpretation focus pri138
marily on the language of the statute.” Second, “the words rather than
the intent survived the procedures” laid out in the constitution—
139
passage, presentment, and enactment.
Everything that drove the court’s pronouncements in Kalal is equally true in the constitutional-interpretation context. It is not the intent of
the legislators or voters but the text that they approved that is part of
the state’s fundamental law. Judicial deference to the policy choices
embodied in a provision requires respect for its language. Only the
words of an amendment survived two successive sessions of the legislature and a statewide referendum of the people. The Missouri Court of
Appeals had it right when it said,
Regardless of the pre-election intentions of the drafters of
the Act, or the views of individual supporters or opponents of
the Proposition, or the explanations of the media, the Proposition and its express language became the law of this state when
the overwhelming majority of the voters adopted the Proposi140
tion. By that law we are bound.
The court that relied so willingly on Justice Scalia in Kalal should also follow his views on the transitive applicability of textualism. Professor Kevin Stack summarizes them:
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INTERPRETATION 17 (1997)). The majority noted elsewhere, “It is the enacted law, not the
unenacted intent, that is binding on the public.” Id. ¶ 44.
137. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 621 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); see
also Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, 540–41 (Mich. 2008)
(“[T]he voters here did not vote for or against any brochure produced by Citizens for the Protection of Marriage; rather, they voted for or against a ballot proposal that contained the actual language of the marriage amendment.”).
138. Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 44.
139. Id. ¶ 52 n.9 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State,
103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 430 (1989)); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 60 (1988) (“After all, Congress votes on the bill, not on the reports. No one can vote against a report, and the President
cannot veto the language of a report.”).
140. Missourians for Honest Elections v. Mo. Elections Comm’n, 536 S.W.2d 766, 774–
75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); see also State ex rel. Evans v. Stewart, 161 P. 309, 312 (Mont. 1916);
Doyle v. Torrence, 310 S.W.2d 425, 427–28 (Tenn. 1958).
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In Scalia’s vision, the Constitution is analogous to a statute, and
it should be interpreted in accordance with the same norms and
interpretive aims that apply to statutes. Scalia thus embraces a
principle of democratic interpretive uniformity under which the
enactedness of a legal text determines that it will be interpreted
according the same interpretive norms as apply to other demo141
cratically enacted texts—textualist originalism.
In addition to Scalia and several of his brethren on the U.S. Supreme
Court, many state courts already use the same methods of construction
142
for both statutory and constitutional cases.
Moreover, many state
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141. Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, 75
U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2004) (citing SCALIA, supra note 136, at 37); see also SCALIA, supra note 136, at 37 (“I wish to address a final subject: the distinctive problem of constitutional
interpretation. The problem is distinctive, not because special principles of interpretation
apply, but because the usual principles are being applied to an unusual text.”). Stack further
notes that Professor William Eskridge uses his “dynamic” approach to interpretation regardless of the type of text (statutory or constitutional) that is subject to analysis. Stack, supra, at
15. Stack goes on to critique this position throughout the rest of the article, arguing that different types of legal documents call for different interpretative approaches (based on, for instance, the ease with which they may be amended). Id. at 57–58.
142. Clark v. Container Corp. of Am., Inc., 589 So. 2d 184, 190 n.4 (Ala. 1991); Brooks v.
Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Alaska 1999); Brewer v. Fergus, 79 S.W.3d 831, 834 (Ark. 2002);
Thompson v. Dep’t of Corr., 18 P.3d 1198, 1200 (Cal. 2001); Danielson v. Dennis, 139 P.3d
688, 691 (Colo. 2006); Ford v. Browning, 992 So. 2d 132, 136 (Fla. 2008); Westerberg v. Andrus, 757 P.2d 664, 666 n.2 (Idaho 1988); People v. Purcell, 778 N.E.2d 695, 699 (Ill. 2002);
Rants v. Vilsack, 684 N.W.2d 193, 199 (Iowa 2004); Snowton v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 6 So.
3d 164, 168 (La. 2009); Davis v. Slater, 861 A.2d 78, 81 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004); Council 23
Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 188 N.W.2d 206, 208 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1971); Clark v. Pawlenty, 755 N.W.2d 293, 304 (Minn. 2008); State ex rel. Long v.
Justice Court, 156 P.3d 5, 8 (Mont. 2007); We the People Nev. ex rel. Angle v. Miller, 192 P.3d
1166, 1170 (Nev. 2008); State ex rel. Richardson v. Fifth Judicial Nominating Comm’n, 160
P.3d 566, 571 (N.M. 2007); Wendell v. Lavin, 158 N.E. 42, 44 (N.Y. 1927); State ex rel. Martin
v. Preston, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (N.C. 1989); Kelsh v. Jaeger, 641 N.W.2d 100, 104 (N.D. 2002);
State v. Rodgers, 850 N.E.2d 90, 92 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006); City of Guymon v. Butler, 92 P.3d
80, 84 (Okla. 2004); Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 859 P.2d 1143, 1147
n.4 (Or. 1993); Commonwealth v. McNeil, 808 A.2d 950, 954 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); Neel v.
Shealy, 199 S.E.2d 542, 545 (S.C. 1973); Acreman v. Sharp, 282 S.W.3d 251, 255 (Tex. App.
2009); Comm. to Reform Hampshire Cnty. Gov’t v. Thompson, 674 S.E.2d 207, 211 (W. Va.
2008); see also Whitcomb v. Young, 279 N.E.2d 566, 571 (Ind. 1972); Op. of the Justices, 484
A.2d 999, 1001 (Me. 1984); Neske v. City of St. Louis, 218 S.W.3d 417, 421 (Mo. 2007); Hall v.
Progress Pig, Inc., 610 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Neb. 2000). But see Mich. United Conservation
Clubs v. Dep’t of Treasury, 608 N.W.2d 141, 145 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Kuhn v. Curran, 61
N.E.2d 513, 517 (N.Y. 1945); State v. Hance, 910 A.2d 874, 878 (Vt. 2006); Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶ 116, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (attempting to justify the distinction between constitutional and statutory methods of
interpretation); Pierre Schlag, Framers Intent: The Illegitimate Uses of History, 8 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 283, 311–22 (1985) (arguing reasons for different methods of interpretation).
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courts use the same methods of construction whether a law was passed
143
by the usual legislative process or by a statewide referendum.
In sum, Justice Diane Sykes and her colleagues in the Kalal majority
sought to establish a method of statutory interpretation that honored
144
the rule of law in Wisconsin. They placed the court’s focus on the text
of the statute before them because only the text possesses the force of
145
law. The same noble motives and persuasive reasons should lead the
court to adopt a Kalal framework for constitutional interpretation.
V. CONCLUSION
When the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued its decision in Kalal, a
majority of the court decided to adopt a particular method of statutory
146
interpretation for all subsequent decisions by Wisconsin courts. In doing so, the court chose to avoid the problems associated with legislative
history, both practical and jurisprudential. Instead, the justices chose to
honor the rule of law by focusing first on the enacted text of the law.
The considerations that drove the court’s majority in Kalal should
lead it to reject the current method it uses to interpret the state constitution. The Busé methodology relies on flawed sources in a futile attempt
to discover a mythical common intent. Moreover, replacing Busé with a
textualist methodology would advance the rule-of-law values that inspired Kalal.
In its next constitutional-interpretation case, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court should draw upon Coulee Catholic Schools v. Labor & Indus. Re147
view Comm’n to finally and emphatically end the reign of Sinclair and
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143. People v. Lopez, 103 P.3d 270, 272 (Cal. 2005); Bickel v. City of Boulder, 885 P.2d
215, 228 n.10 (Colo. 1994); State ex rel. Jones v. Erickson, 244 P. 287, 290 (Mont. 1926); Nevada Tax Comm’n v. Bernhard, 683 P.2d 21, 23 (Nev. 1984); Anthony v. Veatch, 220 P.2d 493,
507–08 (Or. 1950); Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue v. Hoppe, 512 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Wash.
1973); 1985–1986 MICH. ATT’Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP., at 310, 1986 WL 233309; Jack L. Landau, Interpreting Statutes Enacted by Initiative: An Assessment of Proposals to Apply Specialized Interpretive Rules, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 487, 532 (1998); Silak, supra note 56, at 3;
see also Michael M. O’Hear, Statutory Interpretation and Direct Democracy: Lessons from the
Drug Treatment Initiatives, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 283 (2003) (reviewing fifty-one cases
that confirm Prof. Schacter’s conclusion); Schacter, supra note 80, at 119 (reviewing fiftythree cases and concluding that judges apply “ordinary rules of interpretation” to laws passed
by initiative).
144. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 52, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d
110.
145. Id. ¶¶ 44–47.
146. Id. ¶¶ 44–53.
147. Coulee Catholic Schs. v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868.
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Busé and to inaugurate the use of the Kalal principles in state constitutional cases. Justice Stephen Markman of the Michigan Supreme Court
put it well in National Pride at Work:
The role of this Court is not to determine who said what about
the amendment before it was ratified, or to speculate about how
these statements may have influenced voters. Instead, our responsibility is, as it has always been in matters of constitutional
interpretation, to determine the meaning of the amendment’s ac148
tual language.
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148. Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, 542 (Mich. 2008).
One source that was helpful but not cited elsewhere in this article is John Sundquist, Construction of the Wisconsin Constitution-Recurrence to Fundamental Principles, 62 MARQ. L.
REV. 531 (1979).

